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Creativity and Perception
John H. Flowers and Calvin P. Garbin
Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588.

Informal thought about the nature of mental operations important to creative human behavior suggests
that perceptual processes are of considerable importance. The ability to “see relationships among elements” is an attribution commonly made toward authors of major scientific discoveries or of noteworthy
artistic achievements. For example, Shepard (1978,
1981) documented self-reports from several creative
scientists and authors that strongly emphasize the
role of visual imagery and the manipulation of visual
codes in the creative process.
Given the anecdotal and self-report evidence for a
relationship between creative behavior and aspects of
perceptual processing, it initially may seem surprising
that there is a notable void in either research or theoretical articles specifically focused on these issues. In preparing this chapter, for example, we noted that, during
the last six volumes of the Journal of Creative Behavior, there was only one title that included the word perception, and that paper (Goodman & Marquart, 1978)
was limited to a one-page abstract. In addition, we
noted that among seven current textbooks in perception that presently reside on our bookshelves, none
contain the term creativity in their indexes, nor is the
term creative ability addressed at any point in the texts.
Although references to the term perception occasionally
can be found in indexes of monographs specifically

dealing with the topic of creativity, most of these references refer to research related to specific theories about
individual differences in perceptual styles or processing modes, as opposed to broader contemporary issues of perceptual processing. Clearly, most researchers in the field of perception have not touched upon
the topic of creativity, and relatively few researchers
in creativity have chosen to integrate their work with
perceptual issues.

Why Have Perceptual Psychologists Had Little to
Say about Creativity?
One reason that may have inhibited psychologists
who were studying aspects of perception from becoming involved in research on creativity is the fact
that the term itself is not viewed as a scientifically
“tight”‘ concept of the variety preferred by relatively
“operationalistic” behavioral scientists. As has been
noted in earlier research (e.g., Stein, 1956; Taylor,
1960), as well as the contributors to this volume, providing an easily agreed upon operational definition
of creativity that can be related to specific aspects of
observable behavior or specific information-processing operations is problematic. Although there is general agreement among researchers in human thinking
147
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that a key component of creativity is the process of
generating novel mental representations, assessment
of creativity by society is generally done on the basis
of product; that is, does a particular solution, invention, discovery, or artistic contribution meet the joint
criteria of novelty and worthwhileness? Obviously,
a wide variety of mental operations and processes
could contribute to the characteristics of a product
that elicit those subjective evaluations.
The lack of existing literature explicitly relating issues in perception to the study of human creativity
may also be attributable, in part, to fundamental differences in the “level of approach” among behavioral
scientists who study fundamental characteristics of
mental and behavioral processes common across individuals, as opposed to those having primary interest in differences among individuals. Both historically and at present, the majority of research efforts
directed at understanding perceptual processes has
been directed at theories, models, and descriptions
of behavior that apply to perception in general, as
opposed to individuals. The very term creativity, on
the other hand, denotes an attribute that individuals
presumably possess (or at least exhibit) in different
amounts, hence, its study generally assumes an individual differences approach.
In our view, however, neither the fuzziness attributed to the definition of creativity nor its degree of
association with ideographic rather than nomothetic
approaches is as responsible for the lack of an existing body of literature relating creativity and perception as is the fact that perception traditionally has
been studied as a process of organizing information
within the nervous system, whereas studies of mental
processes associated with creative behavior usually
imply the generation of novel representations of information within the nervous system. At first inspection, these two classes of mental activity seem to have
little to do with each other—or worse yet, they may
even be viewed as incompatible operations.

Is Perceptual Organization Incompatible with
Creative Thought?
Although individual theories of perception may
differ substantially in their emphasis upon the importance of stimulus structure versus mental organizational processes (see, e.g., Hochberg, 1981, for a
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review), most theories approach perception as an information reduction process whereby noisy, variable,
and impoverished patterns of environmental energy
become resolved into stable and consistent internal representations optimal for human performance.
Terms such as perceptual organization and perceptual
constancy reflect emphasis on the information reduction processes. The latter term, in particular, emphasizes the role of perception in providing an individual with similar or identical mental representations of
events that may have widely varying physical representations in the environment.
If a major function of “efficient” perceptual processing is to provide perceptual constancy, as well as
to encourage different observers to obtain similar or
identical representations from common environmental stimuli, then it does indeed seem that this organizational aspect of perception works against the generation of novel representations. One might therefore
predict that some measures of perceptual performance
that tap perceptual organizational processes would be
negatively related to measures of creative ability. A
potential consequence of such a relationship would be
a positive association between perceptual deficiencies
or handicaps and creative ability. Case study instances
supportive of a relationship between perceptual handicaps and creative behavior can, in fact, be found in
discussions of artistic and musical achievement. For
instance, some of the innovative stylistic changes in
Beethoven’s later works are commonly attributed to
the increasing severity of his hearing impairment.
However, there are many reasons to believe that
some aspects of perceptual performance should be
positively correlated with creative ability—or at least
with the output of creative products. Many products of creative activity are not simple spontaneous
generations, but result from effortful production, interspersed with the evaluation of feedback. Thus,
handicapping the senses at a peripheral level (e.g.,
blindness or deafness) would certainly disrupt the
ability to evaluate visual and auditory productions
as they are being created. Despite what has been said
about Beethoven’s deafness, it seems absurd to predict that there would be a general negative relationship between basic measures of auditory sensitivity and frequency discrimination ability and creative
output of music among composers, or a negative relationship between visual acuity measures and creative
output of painters.
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The Importance of Executively Controlled
Processing
In our view, however, there are other aspects of perception for which performance measures ought to relate positively to creativity—in particular, processes
under the conscious control of the perceiver. These include the ability to control various aspects of selective
attention, to control figural organization when ambiguous sensory data are presented, to perform manipulations of internal visual and/or auditory representations of perceptual information, and the ability to
equate perceptual experiences obtained from different
sense modalities (cross-modal abilities). Although the
earlier stages of perceptual processing leading to perceptual organization (e.g., sensory transduction, feature extraction, figural synthesis) typically are viewed
as involuntary processes not under executive control,
it is clear that perceptual organization and pattern recognition are influenced jointly by both involuntary or
automatic and executively controlled processing.
At the level of perceptual organization, consider
the examples of the Necker cube and of the reversible
or ambiguous figures commonly found in most introductory psychology textbooks as well as in textbooks
on perception (some examples are given in Figure 1).
In each of these examples, there are contextual cues
that cause a particular organization of the object to be
perceived upon initial inspection. In most versions of
these objects, observers have an ability to reverse the
organization through voluntary changes in visual attention, although the time and effort required for such
reversals, as well as which of the possible organizations is most likely to be initially seen, can be greatly
influenced by modifying the contextual cues supporting either of the organizations. With some modifications, reversal becomes virtually impossible, and
thus only one interpretation is obtained. Executively
controlled processes can, within limits, significantly
modify figural synthesis and organization, allowing a
single physical stimulus to have multiple perceptual
representations. Such processes may thus play a role
in the generation of novel mental representations of
information, which, in turn, could form the basis for
creative products. Indeed, it is this kind of processing
that appears to contribute to high-performance levels
on tests, such as Guilford’s (1967) divergent production test, that are specifically aimed at measuring individual differences related to creativity.

Figure 1. The Necker Cube—a familiar example of how controlled visual attention can change perceptual organization. In
Example A, where the cube is essentially “transparent,” two
distinct organizations of depth can be obtained with moderate ease. In Example B, the shading and obscuring of the internal contours provide additional context making one organization dominant, although the second organization can still
be obtained with effort. In Example C, shading of other parts
of the figure makes the opposite depth organization dominant. In Example D, where the internal contours are totally removed, the alternative depth organization cannot be obtained
at all (by typical subjects), even with considerable mental effort. Note also that, after viewing cube C, it is easier to view
cube A (and even cube B) in the same organization as is dominant for cube C.

Thus, we see two distinct categories of perceptual
processes for which individual variation among different observers might well relate to creativity. The
first category contains the largely involuntary processes of perceptual organization. These are information-reducing processes that promote stability and
organization of percepts, and thus normally tend to
act against the formation of novel representations of
information. The second category of perceptual processes, those under executive control of the observer,
serve to modify and control the actions of the involuntary processes and also may serve to encourage the
generation of novel representations of information.
Extensive data exist on how each of these classes of
processes affects performance as a function of stimulus and task parameters. Unfortunately, the data base
on individual differences among either of these categories of processes is limited. Thus, it is difficult to re-
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late directly specific empirical findings from existing
perceptual studies to either the prediction of creative
behavior in individuals or to modification of the environment to encourage creativity. We feel this indicates a need for additional basic research in individual differences per se, as well as research that directly
relates these individual differences to creative ability.

A Configural Conception of Creativity
The particular topics (and perceptual tasks) that
we will be discussing are selected largely because
they focus on the joint role of involuntarily and executively controlled processes in perception. We are
guided by a broad conception of creativity that assumes that there are essentially three factors that
influence an individual’s creative potential. One
involves the relative “looseness” of involuntary organizational processes. An individual for whom the involuntary processes operate somewhat less deterministically (but perhaps less efficiently) is more likely
to represent environmental data mentally (as well as
data recalled from memory) in novel ways. The potential relationship between schizophrenia and creativity (Keefe & Magaro, 1980; Prentky, 1979) would
seem to illustrate this factor.
The second factor involves the power of executively controlled processes, such as spatial selective
attention, manipulation of mental images, and controlled cross-modal representation. Presumably, an
individual having superior executive control of these
processes is able to produce novel representations of
information through effortful construction and modification of mental representations. This concept of
“creativity through controlled mental effort” is very
different from the concept of creativity attributable
to “loose organizational processes.” For example,
schizophrenics and individuals with schizotypic patterns of cognitive activity are notably weak on performance measures that presumably tap executively
controlled mental processes.
The third factor, we feel, is of importance, particularly to creative thought that involves sudden insight,
that involves processes not under executive control
nor driven by sensory data, but that produces seemingly spontaneous mental representations, often involving visual imagery. Based largely upon self-reports of creative scientists and authors, Shepard
(1978,1981) attributed this aspect of creative activity
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to the same perceptual mechanisms that are normally
coupled to the analysis of sensory input, and that are
responsible for many aspects of perceptual organization. According to Shepard, these highly evolved and
specialized perceptual mechanisms have the ability to
operate upon data other than that obtained from normal sensory input, when decoupled from the sensory
environment, as in such altered consciousness states
as dreams. It is conceivable that the ability to use such
spontaneously generated mental constructions in creative thought could be relatively independent of an
individual’s power of executively controlled mental
operations, but positively correlated with the strength
of perceptual organizational processes.
This three-factor view of creativity, directly based
upon perceptual mechanisms, suggests therefore, a
highly configural, nonlinear relationship between creative ability in the population and specific individual
differences in mental processes. By looking—from an
individual differences perspective—at various perceptual tasks that seem likely to tap differentially involuntary organizational processes and executively
controlled processes, researchers may be in a better
position to form a more detailed model relating specific representational and transformational processes
to creative behavior. Additionally, such research
might guide development of programs or products
for the enhancement of creative ability.

Impairment of Sensory Processes
One of the most highly noticeable individual difference variables in perception is that of impairment
of one or more of the primary senses—at least insofar
as distinguishing normal individuals (including prosthetically correctable persons) from those who have
apparent handicaps. Case study analyses of creative
output from visually or auditorily handicapped individuals is a topic that deserves intensive study on its
own; our limited mention of the topic here is merely
to recognize that the broad categories of differences
in perceptual and cognitive processes that characterize adaptation to severe defects in either hearing or
vision obviously can affect the creative process, albeit
in complex ways. It is a well- known principle of developmental psychobiology that prolonged deprivation of sensory experience, from birth or early in life,
can result in permanent changes in neural structures
that often prevent full recovery of function, even if
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the handicap is later repaired. Furthermore, neural
structures may adapt functions qualitatively different from those assumed by corresponding structures
in sensorily intact individuals. In human behavior,
the consequences of sensory handicaps may affect aspects of memory and cognition that depend upon the
use and manipulation of auditory or visual “codes,”
in addition to the ability to gain information from
the environment. Recognition of this fact has led researchers and educators to develop specialized educational programs for hearing-impaired individuals
that are specifically adapted to differences in modes
of information processing among such individuals.
In addition to producing performance differences per
se, differences in memory codes, attention, and other
control processes attributable to early sensory handicaps obviously have the potential for producing products that are novel when compared with norms of the
general population of nonhandicapped individuals.
We see two major problems, however, in extrapolating general conclusions about creativity from
the study of the perceptually handicapped. The first
problem is the extreme degree of heterogeneity in
types and degree of impairment among such individuals; not to mention potential differences in compensatory processes among individuals who share
relatively similar physical impairments and developmental histories. The second problem is that the ease
of retrieving examples of perceptually handicapped
creative individuals from memory makes the topic
ripe for attributions of correlations between the handicap and the creativity that may not be warranted
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). One may be able
to learn a great deal about the creative processes of
a given handicapped individual through careful case
study, protocol analyses, and other techniques, and
such research potentially could be of tremendous
value to the development of special therapeutic and
educational approaches. As a simple individual difference variable to be applied for understanding the
characteristics of creativity in the general population,
the handicapped-nonhandicapped dichotomy does
not, on the other hand, appear to be very useful.

Environmental Constraints on Sensory Input
It may be more useful to consider the effects, within
unimpaired individuals, of different levels of sensory
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stimulation upon creative thought processes. In particular, the fact that common resources are used in executive control of mental representations and in the processing of corresponding forms of sensory data implies
that perception within a particular modality may interfere with thought processes sharing a common form
of representation. For instance, the generation and
the manipulation of visual images are inhibited when
a task requires processing visual input, and manipulations of linguistic representations may be inhibited
by tasks requiring the processing of speech. The interference between perceptually generated and internally generated codes that share a common modality
easily can be demonstrated by using a task developed
by Brooks (1968). In this task, subjects are required to
imagine a moving dot traveling around a mental image of a block drawn letter, such as a capital F (see Figure 2), and to respond orally yes or no based upon
whether each comer constitutes an external angle (requiring a “right turn” on the part of the dot) or an internal angle (requiring a “left turn”). Time to complete
the circuit with the oral response mode is generally
much less than that required for the same task when
subjects must check off Ys versus Ns in a visually presented answer sheet. However, when subjects are presented with a linguistic search task, requiring them
to indicate whether successive words in memorized
sentences are nouns versus other parts of speech, the

Figure 2. An illustration of the sort of “imaginary stimuli”
used by Brooks (1968) to study the effect of verbal or visually guided response processes on the ability to search visually coded information in active memory. Subjects were required to mentally construct an image of a letter, such as this
capital F, and to indicate whether each comer passed by the
imaginary asterisk consisted of an external or an internal angle. Subjects could perform better on this task if an oral yes-no
response was used than if a visually guided manual response
system was employed, indicating that manipulation of visual
codes shares resources with visual perception.
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visually guided check-response mode produces considerably faster searches than does the oral yes–no
mode. Modality specific interference between imagery and perceptual detection tasks also has been demonstrated by Segall and Fusella (1970), who asked
subjects to construct mental images, such as the appearance of a tree (visual) or the ringing of a telephone
(auditory), and showed selective deficits in the ability
to detect weak auditory or visual signals.
Because documented self-reports of mental events
associated with creative thought often include extensive use of mental imagery (Shepard, 1978, 1981),
it seems plausible that creating an environment that
minimizes potentially interfering sensory input might
be useful in facilitating manipulations of mental image
processing and, hence, contribute to creative thought.
Additional research in how regulation of stimuli (visual and linguistic feedback from a display screen on a
word processor) can affect the speed and quality of creative output is one area of applied perceptual research
that has current value for product development. An
increasing number of products are being released into
the personal and professional software markets that are
designed to aid the initial stages of manuscript planning and organization. These so-called idea processors
are aimed specifically at the facilitation of creative output for a variety of applications (Kellogg, 1986). With
the increasing use of small computers in a variety of
settings, one might expect the developments of similar
products to continue. One attribute of at least some of
the existing hardware is that users are prevented from
viewing previously entered text—a design feature that
seems to assume that the availability of visual feedback, or at least the existence of printed text that stimulates the visual system of the user, is detrimental to
performance.
As Kellogg (1986) pointed out, evaluative research
on these products and on prototypes for future related software aids is woefully lacking. The same
can be said for research that is not tied to a specific
product but that provides general information about
the production as a function of the presence of perceptual stimuli of, for example, text, figural design,
and metaphorical or analogical relationships. Based
upon the implications of such studies as those of
Brooks (1968), it may be the case that the presence of
auditory or visual stimuli, while an individual is attempting to “be creative,” can have certain interfering stimulus-related costs for mental representation
and transformation, and, hence, inhibit creative per-
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formance. The knowledge base that is generated from
such a research effort might prove very useful in the
development of both text-related products and picture-related software aids used in computer-assisted
design. More generally, however, such knowledge
might prove useful in the development of techniques
for fostering increased output of creative activity in a
much wider range of settings, through the teaching of
specific strategies for minimizing perceptual interference with image-based mental operations and other
forms of mental code transformations.

Altered and Transitional States— Decoupling
Perceptual Mechanisms from Sensory Input
Our discussion above has concerned the overlap
in resources between mechanisms normally tied to
the involuntary processes of analyzing and organizing sensory stimulation and those of executively controlled construction and manipulation of visual and
auditory images. A related issue concerns the potential role of the perceptual mechanisms normally
driven by sensory input during unaltered states of
observer consciousness, when those mechanisms are
decoupled from sensory input. Dream states, and
perhaps some drug-induced states, represent examples of such a decoupling. Shepard (1978, 1981) argued that transitions from such states represent a fertile ground for the development of creative ideas,
because the perceptual mechanisms automatically
linked to organizing the sensory world (which are
normally transparent to our conscious experience)
run “on their own,” occasionally constructing novel
and useful percepts and images from fragments of internal neural noise and loosely guided consultations
with memory. According to Shepard (1981), contact
with the linguistic system allows the abstract images
and relationships to be translated into communicable
form. Shepard clearly viewed the mechanisms of perceptual organization that involve spatial relationships
in particular as a powerful source of general knowledge about relationships that can be analogically applied to invention and problem solving:
The creative productions of a brain presumably stem
from whatever intuitive wisdom, whatever deep organizing principles have been built into that brain as a result of the immense evolutionary journey that has issued in the formation of that brain. If the arguments
sketched out in this chapter have any merit, the most
basic and powerful innate intuitions and principles un-
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derlying verbal and nonverbal thought, alike, may well
be those governing the relations, projections, symmetries, and transformations of objects in space. (Shepard,
1981, p. 339)

Thus, Shepard described a very direct relationship
between perceptual processes and creative thought,
making the claim that (1) implicit knowledge of visual relationships among objects, and rules for transforming those relationships, may constitute the fundamental mental operations inherent in much of
creative thought, and (2) that decoupling certain normally involuntary processes from their data source
may allow those same mechanisms to operate as a
primary generator of creative thought. It seems apparent from Shepard’s descriptions of self-report data
that this form of creative thought is not of the controlled variety (as discussed in the previous section)
but is the product of involuntary mental operations
that lead to spontaneous insight. Thus, the effects of
decoupling of normal sensory input during alternative states of consciousness should be viewed as distinct from restricting sensory input in a normal-waking-state individual in order to prevent interference
with controlled manipulation of perceptual codes.
In popular religious and scientific circles, vast
amounts have been written about alternative states
of consciousness that involve such decoupling of sensory input, although, in our view, it is sometimes difficult to determine into which of those circles a given
piece of research/literature should be categorized. It is
also apparent that, throughout much of the history of
civilization, some human beings knowingly have exploited alternative states (including dreams) as a deliberate strategy for fostering creative behavior—not to
mention the use of alternative consciousness states as
a causal construct for particular creative acts. Like research relating either handicaps or psychopathology to
creativity, selection biases and the availability heuristic can play havoc with attempting to relate existing literature on alternate states and creativity either to individual differences in creative potential or to research
into conditions that foster creativity.
It may, however, be profitable to study the extent
to which individual differences in dream recall might
relate to instances of insightful creative thought, as
well as to individual differences in attention and perceptual organization. Such data could provide for a
better empirical grasp on the degree to which information processing in dream or transitional states actually constitutes a major source of creative pro-
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ductions. Mental constructions occurring during an
altered or transitional state can be useful only insofar
as they are remembered, and insofar as they can be
evaluated for application and worthwhileness. It may
be that the degree to which decoupled automatic perceptual processes contribute to creative output has far
more to do with facility in higher level cognitive processes, such as memory storage, retrieval, search, and
comparison, than in individual differences in perceptual organization processes per se.
Consideration of the role of stimulus-decoupled
perceptual organization processes as a fundamental source of creative thought, as Shepard proposed,
leads to an interesting conjecture about the link between efficiency of perceptual organization and
creativity—particularly with respect to how general cognitive defects, such as those associated with
schizophrenia, might relate to creative thought. One
common view of why individuals who possess some
of the traits of schizophrenic thought might be viewed
as creative is that deficiencies in the normal involuntary perceptual organization processes lead to an increased likelihood of an atypical representation of a
perceptual event (see, e.g., Keefe & Magaro, 1980). In
other words, it is the anomalous organization of sensory input, coupled with sufficiently good higher order processes to evaluate the potential worthwhileness of a mental construction (or, alternatively, the
opportunity for a peer to notice the worthwhileness
of a product even if the cognitively impaired individual cannot perform the evaluation), that lead to creative output. However, creativity that is attributable
to looseness in perceptual organization in the presence of stimuli is very different from creativity that is
attributable to perceptual organization processes decoupled from normal sensory inputs. An increased
frequency of transitions from hypnopompic or hallucinatory states (as might be reasonably expected to
occur in association with certain psychotic disorders),
combined with unimpaired (or even superior) mechanisms of perceptual organization, thus represents
a potential alternative route for contributing to creative thought by some individuals who possess dispositions toward cognitive disorders. Moreover, the
relative weakness or looseness in organizational processes and the ability to exploit involuntary organizational processes decoupled from sensory input are
suggested as distinct individual difference variables,
both of which might relate to creativity in the general
population.
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Assessing Individual Variation in Perceptual Organization Ability
Our discussion thus far suggests that obtaining a
better understanding of patterns of individual variation in perceptual organization tendencies might be
highly useful in examining the role of perceptual organization processes in creative thought. Unfortunately,
with the exception of various measures of embedded
figures performance, Gestalt grouping processes and
other related “automatic” processes of perceptual organization have not been subjected to systematic individual difference measurements. Performance measures
on tasks, such as those involving embedded figures,
often do not provide a convenient way of separating
performance attributable to loose perceptual organization (failure to group), from performance attributable to strong, executively controlled focused attention
(ability to break apart). It appears to us, however, that
one should be able to separate the contributions of automatic organization and efficient focused attention,
by selecting a combination of structurally similar tasks,
including some in which perceptual organization is
helpful to performance, and others for which perceptual organization is harmful.
As an example of such an approach, consider the
example of the stimulus displays shown in Figure
3, used by Pomerantz, Sager, and Stover (1977). The

Figure 3. Examples of stimuli used in an “oddball quadrant” detection task employed by Pomerantz, Sager, and Stover (1977). In Example A, the addition of the context elements
causes Gestalt grouping processes that make the unique quadrant more distinctive, whereas in Example B, the rotated context elements obscure the distinction (see text for details).
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task required of the subject was to detect the “oddball” quadrant as rapidly as possible, and choice reaction time (RT) was the dependent variable. In Example
A, the baseline task involves choosing the oddly oriented single parenthesis, located in this example in the
upper left. This display requires a quite effortful scrutiny as the mean RT obtained by Pomerantz et al. was
2,400 msec. However, adding the four extra context elements in the display leads to a perceptual grouping
phenomenon that makes the oddball element stand
out, reducing the RT by nearly a second (for a group
average obtained with college student subjects). Now,
consider the display shown in Example B. Here, different context elements are added (rotated parentheses)
for which the result of organizational processes produces objects perceptually less distinct than the single
parentheses, resulting in an average increase in RT of
550 msec. Thus, in these examples, we have two highly
similar tasks, one for which Gestalt organization helps,
one for which it hurts.
Presumably, individuals with weak organizational
processes would fail to gain as much benefit from the
helpful context, in comparison with more typical subjects, while performing tasks such as that of Example A. On the other hand, such subjects also might be
less susceptible to interference from context stimuli
that disrupt performance of typical subjects. In contrast, subjects possessing nominal automatic grouping processes, but exceptionally powerful executively
controlled focal attentional processes, might exhibit far
less interference from the harmful context, while still
maintaining benefits from the helpful context.
A related set of classification or sorting tasks that
have the potential for separately assessing looseness of
involuntary perceptual organization and the strength
of voluntary visual attention is the one used by Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975). In this experiment, there
were three different basic sorting tasks required of a
subject, and the stimulus response mappings for each
of these is shown in Figure 4. In Condition A (the control condition), subjects sorted stimuli on the basis of
orientation of the leftmost parenthesis; the orientation
of the right parenthesis was held constant. In Condition B, which required subjects to divide attention and
attempt to ignore the irrelevant rightmost parenthesis, the response assignment was determined by the
left parenthesis, and the right parenthesis varied in a
manner orthogonal to the left parenthesis. In this condition, classification times were considerably slower
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Figure 4. Examples of stimuli used by Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975) in a task illustrating how Gestalt grouping affects
selective and divided attention in a visual classification task
(see text for details).

than those of the control condition, provided the spatial separation between the parenthesis pairs was close.
As the spatial separation between the elements was increased beyond a single typespace in other stimulus
sequences, the interference from the irrelevant right
parenthesis diminished.
Condition C required that subjects split the four
possible pairings of parentheses into two groups, such
that the response assignment was determined by the
combination of both parentheses. Unlike either Condition A or Condition B, this task required an evaluation
of both the leftmost and the rightmost parentheses. At
close separations, such grouping seemed to occur involuntarily, as subjects reported perceiving the parenthesis pairs as single objects. In this case, classification
times were actually shorter than for Condition B, because the objects assigned to each category appear to
share common perceptual attributes (e.g., “the fat ones
vs. the skinny ones”). However, at wider separations,
in which involuntary grouping processes break down,
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subjects had to apply effortful divided attention processes, either to try to perceptually group the parenthesis pairs or to separately evaluate each parenthesis and
apply a classification rule. A typical pattern of results
for these three tasks is shown in Figure 5, in which
sorting time is plotted as a function of separation of
the parentheses. Again, these data are based upon the
means of subjects’ performances that were obtained by
Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975).
One might expect, however, that individual differences in the potency of involuntary organizational
processes and individual differences in the executively controlled ability to break up perceptual configurations (as well as divide attention, in this case)
would produce systematic differences in the functions from those shown in Figure 5. An appropriate
application of psychometric scaling procedures to differences among such patterns, in addition to similar
analyses of patterns in such tasks as the “oddball detection” examples in Figure 3, could lead to separate
scales for strength of perceptual organization tendencies and power of voluntary selective attention.
To our knowledge, there is no existing research
on patterns of individual differences in the costs and
benefits of the configural effects that might be obtained by systematic administration of these or similar tasks to large numbers of individuals, in order
to obtain an index of relative organizational power
among different individuals that might be of use for
determining its relationship to creative behavior.
However, given that individual differences in more
traditional measures of embedded figures tasks exist
(even though the voluntary selective component has
not been factored out), and given the recent evidence
of the very unique and actually superior performance
of schizophrenics (compared with normals) on tasks
for which avoidance of grouping contributes to performance (Place & Gilmore, 1980; Wells & Leventhal,
1984), we believe that such individual differences exist, are potentially measurable, and probably do bear
a relationship with other important cognitive attributes including creativity. Given that the presumed
organizational looseness of schizophrenics is often related to creative thought in individuals who perhaps
have a lesser degree of the deficiency (e.g., Keefe &
Magaro, 1980), the data on the psychiatric populations are of considerable interest and are encouraging
for clarifying the “creativity-madness” association
that has been around for centuries.
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Figure 5. A graphical representation of results obtained by Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975) for Tasks A, B, and C of Figure 4.
Sorting times for decks of 32 cards displaying these stimuli are plotted as a function of the physical separation between the pairs
of parentheses. Stimulus sets involving wide spatial separations between the two stimuli greatly slowed sorting in the divided attention task (Task C of Figure 4), while allowing subjects to avoid interference from perceptual grouping in Task B. Presumably
the form of such functions might differ for subjects differing in the potency of their involuntary perceptual organization processes
as well as the power of their controlled visual attention. Reprinted by permission of LEA Associates.

Individual Variation in Intramodal Visual Code
Transformation
In contrast to our lack of knowledge about individual variation in perceptual organizing ability, psychometric tests that directly tap the ability of individuals
to compare transformed visual objects (e.g., rotated
block drawings, folded and unfolded block figures)
have been available for decades (e.g., see Guilford,
1967). Individual variation in abilities to perform
such operations is clearly measurable, and it is apparent that performance on such psychometric tests
correlates with performance of mental tasks or problems that appear to be mediated by use of visual analog codes.
One specific example is a study by Paivio (1978),
who measured subjects’ reaction times for determining which of two clock times (given as digital expressions) would produce the smallest angle between
the hands of a standard analog clock. Paivio found

that, in general, reaction time was a monotonic function of differences in the analog hand angles, providing strong evidence that the task was mediated by
image comparison. In addition, however, subjects
were divided into “high-imagery” and ‘ ‘low-imagery’? groups, on the basis of a median split of performance on a composite of Guilford’s Block Visualization Test, the Minnesota Paper Form Board, and the
Thurstone Space Relations Test. High-imagery subjects produced RTs that averaged about 1 second
faster at each level of angular difference than low-imagery subjects. In contrast, a similar split of the subject population on the basis of a verbal fluency measure (Paivio, 1971) produced no differences between
groups. This study as well as numerous others (e.g.,
see Paivio, 1971, 1978 for a review) provide relatively
convincing evidence that individual differences in
ability to perform top-down manipulation and transformation of visuospatial codes can be predicted effectively with existing psychometric instruments.
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Given the apparent importance of fluent visual
coding in anecdotal reports of creative cognition,
it seems intuitive that psychometric measures of
such visual abilities should relate positively to measures of creative behavior, particularly for those individuals whose creative work is arrived at primarily through the effortful, voluntary route. One must
keep in mind, however, that simple possession of a
mental ability does not necessarily imply that ability
will be used to produce novel and worthwhile products. Creative behavior requires an evaluative component for recognizing when a particular novel representation is of value. Given these considerations,
and our configural view of the creative process, one
should not expect extremely high linear correlations
between measures of visual coding fluency and creative behavior per se.
One issue of importance in determining how specific information-processing characteristics relate to
creativity is whether it is appropriate to view individual differences in performance of specific classes
of perceptual tasks as measures of relatively narrowly defined information-processing abilities, or
whether correlations among specific task performances suggest the existence of a general ability
“factor.” Guilford (1981, 1983) argued that processes,
such as visual code manipulation and cross-modal
transformations (which we will discuss presently),
are all part of a general “transformational ability”
that is a key component of creative thought. Indeed,
one can make a rather strong psychometric argument for that position, as Guilford has done. On the
other hand, perceptual psychologists who are aware
that different neural structures may be involved in
intramodal versus cross-modal transformations,
and also that common neural structures may be involved in both voluntary and involuntary processing of visually coded information, are more likely to
have interest in specific comparisons among tasks.
One research question that bears upon the relationship between specific visual information-processing abilities and our configural model of creativity
is whether fluency in controlled visual transformations might be related to the frequency of spontaneous insight in creative thought. We have thus far implied, as has Shepard (1978, 1981), that spontaneous
novel constructions are basically the result of involuntary representational processes, decoupled from
their normal sensory source of data. However, it
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must be noted that most of the anecdotal reports of
such spontaneous insight, summarized by Shepard
and others, have come from individuals who were
likely to score very high on measures of mental abilities and who were (or still are) known to have put in
large amounts of controlled mental effort on problems related to their creative achievements. The selection, refinement, and use of images spontaneously
generated during transitional or altered states likely
may depend upon effortful executive processes,
suggesting that spontaneous insight should not be
viewed as a totally involuntary occurrence. Moreover, mental activity that substitutes for the sensory signals that normally drive mechanisms of
perception, insofar as they are influenced by memory activities, may be highly structured by previous
effortful mental code manipulations. In short, spontaneous insight may not be so spontaneous and is
conceivably quite closely related to mental transformation abilities of both intramodal and intermodal
varieties.

An Example of the Interplay of Involuntary
and Executively Driven Creative Processes:
Synesthesia and Cross-Modal Representations
Previously, we have posited that these two very
different processes might produce similar creative
products. In this section, we will look at two related
processes, one perceptual (automatic) and one cognitively mediated (executively controlled), that do indeed seem to lead to similar and potentially creative
representations of the environment.
Theorists and artists long have recognized the correspondences, interrelationships, and interdependencies of the senses as they are used to capture information about the world. Aristotle and other early
thinkers posited various relationships of cross-modal
process or product, and Bishop Berkeley added his
notion of their ontogeny. More recently, Stevens (e.g.,
1959), Gibson (1966), and Marks (e.g., 1978, 1982) have
provided more refined theories and hypotheses about
the nature, workings, and meanings of these correspondences. Particularly for Marks, the evidence of
artistic awareness and of creative use of these correspondences adds weight to various laboratory studies that are in support of the theoretical ideas of crossmodal equivalences and sensory unity.
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Most people are familiar with the use of onomatopoetic words, such as “hiss,” “crack,” and “woff,” to
convey the auditory characteristics of a sound as well
as its semantic meaning. But the sounds of words
also seem to convey other information. Kohler (1947)
showed that most people matched the pseudowords
“maluma” and “takete” with the rounder and the
more angular of two line figures, respectively. As a
demonstration, Marks (1978) replicated the finding
using a production task in which two children were
asked to draw the visual representations of these
words. The drawing of takete was clearly the more
angular for each person. As another example of how
word sounds can supply nonauditory information,
Sapir (1929) and later Newman (1933) asked subjects
about the size of objects referred to by nonsense syllables and found the words containing the letter /a/
were judged to refer to larger objects than did those
containing /i/. Finally, most people in our society are
familiar with the relationships between colors and
temperatures—red is “hot” whereas blue is “cool.”
These types of correspondences are quite different
from the wholly involuntary phenomena of true synesthesia, in which “a small minority of people experience a curious sensory blending, where stimulation of
a single sense arouses a melange of sensory images”
(Marks, 1978, p. 83). In addition to truly synesthetic
individuals, there are widespread reports of involuntary synesthesia produced by various consciousnessaltering drugs, such as LSD and hashish.
As interesting and well-documented as true involuntary synesthesia is, it is not, in itself, a creative
product, just as the novel representations of schizophrenic thought are not. Creative products require
the additional processes of appropriate selection and
presentation of those novel representations. Unlike the
schizophrenics’ art, which is often identified as creative after production, the synesthetics must choose
whether or not to capture their mental representations and present their novel version of the world.
Furthermore, although loose perceptual organization is potential source of novel representations for
synesthetics (as for schizophrenics), documentation
of creative products from true synesthetics is notably
lacking. In part, the lack of documented examples simply may reflect the relative infrequency of true synesthetic individuals in the population, relative to schizotypic or schizophrenic individuals. But from each of
these sources of anomalous percepts, numerous prod-
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ucts have arisen. According to Marks (1978), synesthesia has enjoyed two periods of extensive study, the first
40 years of the twentieth century, and an earlier period
during the nineteenth century. It was during this earlier period, when synesthesia was of interest not only
to scientists and physicians but also to musicians, that
creative products were introduced that clearly sprang
from the perceptual phenomena. Perhaps the best
known of these were the multimodal concerts that
mixed music with colored lights and occasionally with
odor. Louis-Bertrand Castel built the first light organ in
1735. This organ and others like it produced a particular colored light along with each note as the keys were
depressed. Numerous pieces were written for and performed with these instruments. Laser light shows are
a more recent version of this same artistic use of the
close relationship between color and tonality to produce desired affective responses.
Also, during the nineteenth century and later,
there were numerous linguistic expressions of synesthesia-like experiences, or synesthetic metaphors.
The following examples of such poetry are taken
from Marks (1978): Charles Baudelaire’s “Correspondences,” “perfumes fresh as children’s flesh, sweet
as oboes, green as prairies,” and Arthur Rimbaud’s
“Sonnet of the Vowels” “A black, E white, I red, U
green, O blue.” Examples of synesthetic metaphor in
literature are (from Marks, 1982): “the sound of coming darkness” (Poe); “a soft yet glowing light, liked
lulled music” (Shelley); and “music suddenly opened
like a luminous book” (Conrad Aiken).
On interesting point concerning these uses of
color-sound correspondence and poetic metaphor
(which is an important difference between these productions and those of schizophrenics) is that none of
these authors appear to have been truly synesthetic
themselves (although one may conjecture about those
authors who had a history of narcotic use, e.g., Poe).
Yet they were able to produce creative results using
these correspondences in ways so compelling that we
not only understand and agree with their meanings,
but often do not even immediately notice that there
are “crossed” or “mixed” modality-specific adjectives
and nuances. Marks provided experimental evidence
that most persons have (or can develop) a strongly internalized correspondence of cross-modal relationship between certain visual and auditory characteristics (primarily brightness and loudness). Thus, we see
that an automatic perceptual process—the capabil-
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ity and tendency toward cross-modal associations—
is necessary for the appreciation of creative products
generated by an executively controlled process.
In this discussion, we have tried to give an example of how knowledge of an infrequent, perceptual,
and automatic phenomenon (synesthesia) can provide the impetus for the use of executively controlled
processes to create artistic products. Finally, the appreciation of these creative products greatly depends
upon the ability to “perceptually resonate” with those
products, an ability that seems to be nearly universal
and automatic.

Summary and Conclusions
We have argued that the generation of creative behavior can result from a combination of involuntary
and executively controlled processes. These processes
rely heavily on neural mechanisms and systems that
have evolved primarily as perceptual systems. However, these systems, which embody highly sophisticated computational and inferential mechanisms, also
serve to operate on mental codes actively retrieved
from memory (e.g., conscious generation and modification of imagery). In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that these same mechanisms can be the source
of spontaneously generated images or representations,
when their normal driving source of sensory stimulation is decoupled, as in transitions from dreams or altered states. Such spontaneous generation, if appropriately selected and recognized as useful, perhaps can
produce the sudden creative insights characterized by
many self-reports from creative individuals.
According to our analysis, creativity thus can result from some combination of (1) novel percepts attributable to departures from the normal deterministic processes of perceptual organization, (2) effortful
conscious mental activity involving manipulation and
transformation of codes that generate novel representations, and (3) spontaneous generation of novel representations. Because the relative contributions of each
of these to a specific creative achievement presumably
varies markedly across both situations and individuals, the relationship between specific cognitive abilities
or characteristics of processing and the likelihood of an
individual’s producing products judged to be creative
is highly configural and thus difficult to measure. The
configurality of factors is particularly problematic in
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that individual differences in cognitive processing that
affect these three 4 “routes” to creative thought probably are not independent. For example, the looseness in
perceptual organization that may characterize creative
individuals with schizotypal thought patterns may
well be negatively correlated with ability to make effortful mental transformations as well as the ability to
recognize that a novel mental representation is worthwhile. We do believe, however, that research efforts
into individual differences in specific perceptual characteristics potentially can be useful in both increasing
our understanding of their relationships to creative behavior, as well as for determining circumstances that
might foster creative thought. As we have noted, research literature describing individual differences in
perceptual organization tendencies is notably lacking. The study of individual differences in executively
controlled transformations of mental representations
has received considerably more research effort, due
to a long existing presumption that such operations
are closely related to measures of basic mental abilities. However, the “mental measurement” motivation
for much of this research, has, in our view, directed researchers more toward the study of “common transformational ability factors” (e.g., Guilford, 1981, 1983)
rather than toward the properties of specific types of
mental code manipulations, such as synesthetic metaphor. Lastly, the literature on spontaneous generation
of novel representations by perceptual mechanisms is,
at present, highly speculative, and consists primarily
of self-report anecdotes.

A Flow Diagram of the Creative Process and Its
Implications
To summarize our view of how processes related
to perception influence the creative process, we offer the flow diagram shown in Figure 6. In addition,
Table 1 summarizes some of our conjectures about
the relationships between various components of the
flow diagram and some individual difference variables potentially measurable by existing or designable assessment instruments and surveys.
Essentially, Figure 6 is a visual summary of our
previous discussions of a configural view of the creative process. It lists as sources of novel representations (1) atypical involuntary processes of perception, including both loose organizational processes
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Figure 6. A schematic representation of our view of how involuntary and executively controlled perceptual processes contribute
to creative thought (see text for details).

and true synesthesia, (2) spontaneous (and involuntary) generation of insight and imagery, (3) conscious
perceptual organization, (4) conscious intermodal
transformations of representations, and (5) conscious
cross-modal transformations of representations. In
addition, it includes the process of selection of novel
representation and feedback to the executively controlled processes for purposes of refining the potential creative product.
In Table 1, we have chosen to relate the uses of each
of the potential sources of novel representations discussed in this chapter together with an “efficiency” ‘
selection mechanism drawn from the following set of
individual differences variables: (1) strength of per-

ceptual organization, SPO; (2) imagery ability, IM;
(3) general measures of transformation ability, T; (4)
schizotypal thought, ST; (5) drug usage, DU; (6) ability to report dreams, DR; and (6) amount of reported
conscious effort expended on the problem for which
a creative solution is found, EF. Note that these items
constitute a nonexhaustive sample of potentially measurable individual differences variables. As we have
mentioned previously, respected psychometric instruments exist that presumably tap some of these,
whereas for others, instruments would need to be developed. Furthermore, measurement of some of the
self-report variables (such as DR and EF) would most
likely involve both validity and reliability problems

Table 1. Hypothetical Associations between Modes of Generating and Selecting Creative Representations and Various Measures of Individual Differences (see text for a detailed explanation).
Source

SPO

IM

T

ST

DU

DR

EF

Loose perceptual organization

–

–

–

+

+?

?

–?

Synesthesia

?

+?

?

–?

+

?

?

Spontaneous imagery

+?

+

+

–?

?

+

+

Conscious perceptual organization

+

+

+

–

–?

?

+

Intramodal transformation

+

+

+

–

–

?

+

Cross–modal transformation

?

+?

?

–

?

?

+?
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that we will not address here. Given those disclaimers, and with the additional disclaimer that nearly all
the cell entries are based upon our own current personal speculations as opposed to existing data, we offer this table of hypotheses as a guide for potential future research. The cell entries themselves consist of +
and — signs to indicate presumed positive and negative correlations, together with ? signs that specify either that no particular relationship is likely to exist,
or, if there is one, we have no basis to speculate its directionality. Additionally, we have used the question
mark as a modifier to indicate above average uncertainty about our speculations.
We should call attention to one pattern among these
hypothetical intercorrelations that emphasizes our previous statements about the configural nature of creativity. That pattern is that individuals whose creativity stems largely from anomalous perceptual inputs
(i.e., individuals with loose perceptual organization
and perhaps a rare, creative, true synesthetic) are likely
to be very different from creative individuals who rely
more heavily upon executively controlled processes.
Conceivably, this might bear upon differences in the
types of creative products that are developed by individuals who rely predominantly upon anomalous percepts for novel representations, as opposed to those
arising from some combination of executively controlled manipulations of representations and spontaneous imagery and/or insight. As a possible case in
point, one often encounters examples of schizophrenic
paintings and drawings, yet rarely does one encounter
mention of schizophrenic poetry or sculpture.
As a final point, we do not wish to imply, by our
apparent emphasis upon individual difference variables in this final section of this chapter, that research
on conditions that affect the likelihood of creative behavior within a given individual is less important
than research aimed at predicting patterns of creativity among individuals. Clearly, the two classes of research complement each other; by learning more
about relationships between perception-related processes as varieties of creative behavior, we may discover strategies for optimizing creative production
within individuals. Similarly, through applied research aimed at development of “thinking aids,” “designing aids,” and “writing aids,” or through the
evaluation of such products, we may discover additional relationships among perceptual and cognitive
processes and the creative process.
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